Introductory Bayesian pragmatics



9.19: Computational Psycholinguistics
22 November 2023
Roger Levy

Ad-hoc scalar inference



Bob can only say one word to communicate with you and he says: ***"glasses"***

(Vogel et al., 2014)

Ad-hoc scalar inference

A B C

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Empirical finding: >75% of experimental participants choose character **B**!

(Vogel et al., 2014)

What is *said* and what is *meant*



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

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

Coordination games



Formalizing theories of semantics & pragmatics

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- Probabilistic models over rich logical structures finally allow us to formalize joint semantic/pragmatic models
- Allows us to connect insights about linguistic meaning from across cognitive science—linguistics, AI, cognitive psychology, social cognition, philosophy

Semantics: principle of **compositionality**

The meaning of a complex expression is determined by the rules by which the expression is formed as applied to the meaning of the expression's subparts.



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



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

$$= [\![VP]\!]([\![NP]\!])$$



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

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

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

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

$= [\![Adj]\!]([\![N]\!])$

...

Pragmatics: Grice, 1975

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE.

Grice's maxims (in his own words)

- **Quality**: Try to make your contribution one that is true, i.e.:
  - Do not say what you believe to be false.
  - Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
- **Quantity**:
  - Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
  - Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
- **Relation**: Be relevant
- **Manner**: Be perspicuous, i.e.:
  - Avoid obscurity of expression
  - Avoid ambiguity
  - Be brief
  - Be orderly

(Grice, 1975)

Generating implicatures

- Assuming that the maxims hold often allows listeners to infer meaning intentions on the part of the speaker that go beyond the literal meaning of the speaker's utterance
- These additional meaning intentions are **implicatures.**

Examples of the maxims in action

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- Example:
  A. *I could really use a cup of coffee.*
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- Assuming the maxims of **Quality** (be truthful) and **Relation** (be relevant) holds allows B to understand A's declarative statement as a request for information, and allows A to understand B's response as providing that information

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- In addition to the Maxims of Quality and Relation, assuming the Maxim of **Quantity** holds allows A to infer that there were some of B's top-choice schools that B did *not* get into

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- The maxim of **Manner** licenses the inference that A's performance may not have been that great.

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  - That the game is purely cooperative

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

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



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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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



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



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



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

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



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







…

- …but without conventions, there’s no way to do this reliably!

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- Consider the conventions offered us by ***some*** and ***all***
- Two meanings: ∀, E¬∀
- Two signals:
  - ***all*** is compatible only with meaning ∀
  - ***some*** is compatible with both meaning ∀ and meaning E¬∀
- For simplicity, assume prior P(E¬∀)=P(E¬∀)=1/2

Bayesian theories of pragmatics

(Frank & Goodman, 2012; Bergen et al., 2016; Goodman & Frank, 2016; Franke, 2009; Jäger & Ebert, 2009; Jäger, 2011)

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(Frank & Goodman, 2012; Bergen et al., 2016; Goodman & Frank, 2016; Franke, 2009; Jäger & Ebert, 2009; Jäger, 2011)

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- Simple model of *literal interpretation*:

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

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

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

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

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The Rational Speech-Act (RSA) model

(Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016)

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

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

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∃¬∀	?
∀	?

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

Modeling hypothesis: speakers are ***softmax decision-theoretic agents*** *that prefer* ***high-utility utterances:***

$$\text{Utility}^{(1)}(u;m) = \log P^{(0)}_{\text{Listener}}(m|u) - c(u)$$

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

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

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



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



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

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



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Softmax optimality parameter

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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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Scalar implicature in RSA: listening



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

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

Speaker—listener recursion in RSA

- The process of recursion strengthens the implicature



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

Conceptual framing

- Speaker and listener got (close) to a Pareto-optimal strategy by combining two ingredients:
  - Language knowledge (lexicon/grammar) as the *raw materials* for initial solutions to the communication game
  - General principles of socio-cognitive reasoning to craft these raw materials into more efficient solutions
- These two ingredients together allow discourse participants to do *so much more* than either one alone

Levinson's (2000) typology of implicature

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Q-implicature

(Horn's Q)

What isn't said isn't meant

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Pat has three children

↓

Pat has **exactly three** children

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(Horn's "division of pragmatic labor")

Align utterance simplicity with situation stereotypicality

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I got the car to start
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Q/I Tradeoff

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Can we explain this typology from basic principles in a probabilistic pragmatic framework, respecting linguistic form, semantic composition, and world knowledge?

Q/I tradeoff in rational speech-act theory

I injured a child→it WASN'T my child

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Assumed alternative set:
*I injured **my** child*
*I injured **a** child*
*I injured **someone else's** child*

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$$c(\text{my}) = c(\text{a}) = 0$$
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Assumed alternative set:
*I injured **my** child*
*I injured **a** child*
*I injured **someone else's** child*

Q/I tradeoff in rational speech-act theory

I injured a child→it WASN'T my child

$$c(\text{my}) = c(\text{a}) = 0$$
$$c(\text{someone else's}) = 1$$
$$P(\text{MINE}) = \frac{1}{2}$$



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

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

Q/I tradeoff in rational speech-act theory

I injured a child→it WASN'T my child *I broke a finger→it WAS my finger*

$$c(\text{my}) = c(\text{a}) = 0$$
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

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

I broke a finger→it WAS my finger

$$c(\text{my}) = c(\text{a}) = 0$$
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

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

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

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

Q/I tradeoff in rational speech-act theory

- Prior probability and simplicity trade off against one another
- But they aren't symmetric!



A rich testbed for exploring Q/I tradeoff

The man injured a finger   *The man injured a child*

(Poppels & Levy, 2015)

A rich testbed for exploring Q/I tradeoff

The man injured a finger *The man injured a child*

His? **Someone else's?**

(Poppels & Levy, 2015)

A rich testbed for exploring Q/I tradeoff

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

- Five predictions from the rational speech-act model:

(Poppels & Levy, 2015)

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

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     The man broke a nose *The python broke a nose*

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

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(Poppels & Levy, 2015)

A rich testbed for exploring Q/I tradeoff

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

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

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

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

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(Poppels & Levy, 2015)

A rich testbed for exploring Q/I tradeoff

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

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  4. "Only-one-of" nouns should favor *other* judgments

     The man broke a finger   *The man broke a nose*
  5. Allowing null determiners should favor *own* judgments

     The man injured a child   *Man injured child*

(Poppels & Levy, 2015)

A rich testbed for exploring Q/I tradeoff

- 1348 judgments of 108 sentence prompts
- Multivariate mixed-effects logistic regression analysis



1. Effect of prior
2. Overall *other* skew
3. Relational nouns favor *own*
4. "Only-one-of" nouns favor *other*
5. Null determiners favor *own*

(Poppels & Levy, 2015)

Adjectives: a range of semantic types

- **Intersective**: *living*, *blue*
- **Scalar/Gradable**:
  - **Relative**: *short*, *expensive*
  - **Absolute**: *dangerous*, *full*
- **Non-intersective**: *possible*, *alleged*
- **Anti-intersective**: *former*, *counterfeit*

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Degree semantics for scalar adjectives

Mary is tall

(Kennedy, 2007)

Degree semantics for scalar adjectives

- The meaning of a scalar adjective like *tall* does two things

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

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

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Degree semantics for scalar adjectives

- The meaning of a scalar adjective like *tall* does two things
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

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

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Mary is tall **TRUE**



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Mary is tall



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Mary is tall



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Mary is tall **FALSE**



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

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

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

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Mary is tall **FALSE**



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Observations regarding degree semantics

- Differences in scale structure can predict validity of compositions

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fullness

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fullness

✓*The glass is perfectly full.*
✓*The glass is perfectly empty.*

Observations regarding degree semantics

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

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Observations regarding degree semantics

- Differences in scale structure can predict validity of compositions

fullness

✓ *The glass is perfectly full.*
✓ *The glass is perfectly empty.*

danger

✓ *The neighborhood is perfectly safe.*
✳ *The neighborhood is perfectly dangerous.*

What the degree semantics doesn't say



What the degree semantics doesn't say

- This is a very elegant model



What the degree semantics doesn't say



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

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

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  - How does *tall elephant* turn out to mean something different from *tall mouse*?

What the degree semantics doesn’t say



- This is a very elegant model
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- But it doesn’t say *how* this context-sensitivity is achieved!
  - How does *tall elephant* turn out to mean something different from *tall mouse*?
  - How can the same *individual* be evaluated as either tall or not tall in different contexts?

What the degree semantics doesn't say



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- But it doesn't say *how* this context-sensitivity is achieved!
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What the degree semantics doesn't say



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

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

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(Stephen Curry is 6'2"; this is the 12th percentile of NBA player heights)

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

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Stephen Curry is a tall basketball player.

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Towards a pragmatic model for scalar adjectives

- Desiderata
  - Inference on a continuum of possible scalar values
  - A threshold representation

The Lassiter & Goodman model

- The literal-listener model of interpretation:

$$L_0(m|u,\theta) \propto \begin{cases} P(m) & m \geq \theta \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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

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

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

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

A speaker model

- Assume a set of *alternative utterances* available to speaker
  - For "Pat ate some of the cookies", alternatives were *some/all*
  - For "I injured a finger", alternatives were *a/my/someone else's*
- Here, we assume alternatives (to start) *tall* and **silence** (∅)



tall?

∅?

Lassiter & Goodman's cost assumption:

$$\text{cost}(\text{tall}) = \text{cost}(\emptyset) + 2$$

$$\text{Utility}(u|m,\theta_u) = \log L_0(m|u,\theta_u) - \text{cost}(u)$$

$$S_1(u|m,\theta_u) \propto e^{\text{Utility}(u|m,\theta_u)}$$

$$S_1(u|m,\theta_u) \propto \frac{L_0(m|u,\theta_u)}{e^{\text{cost}(u)}}$$

A pragmatic listener



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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This is a proposal of non-trivial theoretical depth and interest; let's discuss!

Visualizing pragmatic listener inferences

$$L_1(m, \theta_u | u) \propto S_1(u | m, \theta_u) P(m) \underline{P(\theta_u)}$$



$P(\theta_u)$

(Figures due to Dan Lassiter)

Visualizing pragmatic listener inferences

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

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

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

(Figures due to Dan Lassiter)

Antonyms



(Due to Dan Lassiter)

Absolute adjectives

- *full/empty, wet/dry, safe/dangerous, ...*
  - meanings are less (not?) context-dependent
  - meanings are sharp(er)
  - reference classes apparently not relevant to interpretation

(Due to Dan Lassiter)

The pragmatic model on *full*

- Crucially, fullness is a ***bounded*** scale!



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

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

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

(Graph due to Dan Lassiter)

Bounds on scales

- On the Lassiter & Goodman model, asymmetries in the interpretations of adjectives arise naturally as a consequence of the prior



(Graph due to Dan Lassiter)

Summary

- Scalar adjectives are a simple example, but pose an additional challenge for pragmatics models
- Some part of the *literal meaning of an utterance* must get contextually determined
- This is one of the simplest examples of interleaving of semantic representation and probabilistic pragmatic inference
- Pieces of the puzzle:
  - Logical semantic representations
  - Latent-variable treatment of pieces of these representations
  - Prior probabilities on likely speaker meanings
  - Joint, utility-driven posterior inference on latent semantic variables and speaker meaning